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**"COME OVER TO MACEDONIA AND HELP US"**  
**(ACTS 16:9)**

BY  
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## ABSTRACT

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Post-Cold-War calls for improving collective security through conflict prevention, as opposed to post-conflict crisis response, led in 1993 to establishment of the United Nation's first preventive deployment in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The command includes a United States peacekeeping task force under UN operational control. This study explores the successes and failures of the preventive mission, proving that conflict prevention is both possible and cost effective, but also uncovering doctrinal contradictions associated with applying traditional peacekeeping structures and doctrine to a new-era interventionist peace operation. Analysis of the United States' role in conflict prevention indicates that problems with US-UN command and control continue to plague combined missions, undermining international will to intervene for collective security.

### Introduction

Since 7 Jan 1993, a "preventive" peacekeeping force has operated in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), including 500 American peacekeepers. The United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) is the world's first and only "preventive deployment."<sup>1</sup> UNPREDEP's history proves that deploying soldiers before conflict can help stabilize an area of potential crisis, but it hints also that preventive concepts may be crippled by doctrinal contradictions and a lack of international will.

UNPREDEP operates under UN mandates which establish international presence, identify dangerous developments, and bolster a fledgling republic critical to the stability of the southern Balkans.

The military mandate, specified in Security Council Resolution (SCR) 795, 11 December 1992, and extended at six month intervals thereafter, orders UNPREDEP to

establish a presence on the Macedonian side of the republic's border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Kosovo) and Albania, with an essentially preventive mandate. Monitor and report any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence in the stability of Macedonia or threaten its territory.<sup>2</sup>

The civil affairs component<sup>3</sup> of UNPREDEP, headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), was formed under SCR 908, dated 31 March 1994 and renewed periodically, which encourages

the special representative of the secretary general for the former Yugoslavia, in cooperation with the authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to use his good offices as appropriate to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the republic.

The dynamics of this preventive mission reveal how traditional peacekeeping principles and diplomacy must be adapted for a preventive context.

Preventive deployments first must be discussed in the context of preventive diplomacy. Then, analysis of the successes of UNPREDEP will offer insights on how preventive deployment relates to traditional peacekeeping principles and methods, problems of operating where consent is not universal, and challenges facing the US in preventive deployments.

#### Preventive Deployment and Preventive Diplomacy

With the superpower struggle over, preventive concepts seem to offer obvious benefits: lower cost, fewer wars, reduced suffering, lowered tensions, and more tractable diplomatic problems. (One dramatic example compares only the financial cost of a "pound of cure." The US spent at least \$2B in 1994 for the Somalia mission, but only \$390 million in Somali development assistance in the previous 30 years.<sup>4</sup>) Virtually every prominent head of state has called for "preventive diplomacy" from the UN.<sup>5</sup> The Secretary-General responded with his Agenda for Peace, in which he described the ways preventive diplomacy, and preventive deployments, could be used to prevent conflict.<sup>6</sup>

In UNPREDEP preventive deployment complements diplomacy as it does in traditional peacekeeping. Yet using soldiers under UN mandate to prevent conflict seems to be a new use of military force. Diplomacy and military deployments usually serve national self-interest, but the UN combines national interests into an

international interest, applying "timely early warning as well as diplomatic talent and perhaps military monitoring resources"<sup>7</sup> within the parameters of traditional peacekeeping--consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self defense or defense of the mandate.

In September 1988, before the end of the Cold War, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. F. Petrovsky proposed a preventive military mechanism, with UN observers stationed along "frontiers within the territory of a country that seeks to protect itself from outside interference at the request of that country alone"<sup>8</sup> (emphasis added). This proposal anticipates UNPREDEP's mission; the command deployed at Macedonia's invitation to monitor its troubled borders with Serbia and Albania.

Discussion of Petrovsky's proposal raised questions about partial consent, deterrence posture and violations of sovereignty, all of which have troubled the Macedonia deployment. Johan Joergen Holst notes that in preventive situations

it may not be possible or desireable to obtain the consent of the alleged threatening parties. . . . In this instance, the peace-keeping force would become a deterrent force.<sup>9</sup>

Further, a preventive deployment

might eventually oblige member states, without express consent, to allow fact-finding missions to operate unhindered on their sovereign territory.<sup>10</sup>

These issues begin to distinguish preventive deployment from traditional peacekeeping. Can an international preventive force protect a weak nation? What is the function of preventive deployment, fact-finding or deterrence? Will it operate without

full consent or in violation of sovereignty?

NATO occupies Bosnia in place of UNPROFOR, the UN is out of money, the mission to Somalia ended in disgrace, and the Security Council and Secretary-General are less ready to use peacekeepers. The United States reluctantly uses the UN to support US interests,<sup>11</sup> and the policy and budget debate within the US government jeopardizes the effectiveness of the UN in its peacekeeping role.

The UN struggles with post-Cold-War problems similar to those challenging the United States: the necessity to select among crises, less willingness to deploy forces, budget shortfalls, and drawdown of available forces from member states.

In this environment, preventive concepts hold a weak hand. Major powers deploy soldiers where they have important or vital interests. The result is a de facto continuation of Cold War decision-making; responding to emergencies overcomes planning to prevent crises. Yet UNPREDEP deserves study, to show how pre-crisis diplomacy and preventive deployment are cost-effective.

#### The Success of Preventive Deployment in the Balkans

Has UNPREDEP prevented war in the southern Balkans? William J. Durch in 1993 noted the problem with identifying preventive success: "A deterrent (preventive) threat is difficult to evaluate, because when it succeeds, nothing happens."<sup>12</sup> Analysis of UN work in Macedonia proves that statement false; much has happened. However, other factors also contribute to the absence of conflict in Macedonia.

### Stabilizing Factors in the Southern Balkans

Stabilizing factors include US policy, internal Macedonian political decisions, and the regional postures of Macedonia's neighbors. US policy recognizes the complex interlocking tension in the region and seeks to forestall a wider Balkan war between NATO members Greece and Turkey, the region's dominant ethnic/religious competitors. The US uses bilateral links with several Balkan nations, including Macedonia and Albania, to place pressure where it will help the most.<sup>13</sup>

But US and UN policy alone do not account for stability. The international community brings an array of organizations to the Macedonian problem, including the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), and many humanitarian, economic, and relief assistance organizations.

[This] mix is needed to allay mistrust, buttress the local forces and institutions of accommodation, keep negotiation channels open, control imminent violence, propose settlements, and so on. . . . [The] preservation of Macedonia as a fragile new multiethnic Balkan state may be explained in part by the U.N. preventive peacekeeping force, the CSCE [now OSCE] observer mission, U.S. warnings to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, NGO dialogues, and other activities that have helped so far to keep external pressures, internal tensions, and local episodes of violence from escalating.<sup>14</sup>

The posture of neighboring states also affects stability, in military, economic and diplomatic terms. Serbia has avoided military confrontation with the UN and the US, but there is no evidence that they planned military confrontation with Macedonia, absent a US or UN presence. In fact, as noted below, UNPREDEP's

deployment, and especially the US participation, actually heightened tensions temporarily.

Macedonia's other neighbors have also avoided military provocation, although their strong antipathy to Macedonia's existence has resulted in diplomatic and economic harrassment. Bulgaria engages in typical Balkan ethnic propaganda with exaggerated anti-Macedonia rhetoric. Albania intervenes in Macedonian affairs by supporting ethnic Albanian autonomy in Macedonia and Serbia (the Kosovo region). A protracted Greek embargo targeted Macedonia's name, flag, and national identity. Yet none of these neighbors has used a military threat.

Finally, credit belongs to Macedonian leaders, whose will for a peaceful, multi-ethnic society offers hope for regional stability. President Gligorov, who remains in office despite serious injuries from an assassination attempt in October 1995, holds together a loose federation of Balkan entities. His dominantly Orthodox government contains ethnic Albanian Muslims, whose political parties participated in troubled elections which nationalistic Macedonian parties boycotted.

He reduced military risk and perhaps prevented civil war by demilitarizing a newly-independent Macedonia. In 1992, he asked Serbia to remove all material elements of the former Yugoslav army, which stripped the republic's armed forces of military capability, but which also signalled peaceful intent to neighboring states and created "breathing space" to focus on economic reform and political coalition without armed factions

operating in the country. His subsequent strategic request for UN and US assistance was crucial to regional stability. Unfortunately, there is no clear heir to this strong, 80-year-old leader, known as the "Silver Fox" to Macedonians.

Presence

The UN command also enhances stability. It focuses international and regional attention on the issue of Macedonia's stability, reduces the risk of conflict due to border tensions and the lack of diplomatic relations between Serbia and Macedonia, and moderates internal political friction. Evidence abounds in Macedonia that preventive missions can improve regional stability, if not prevent war.

First, UNPREDEP serves notice to regional parties that the continued peaceful existence of the Republic of Macedonia enjoys international support. Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria and Greece must measure their actions against the knowledge that the military and civil affairs arms of the UN command monitor and report significant developments through UN channels and national chains of command, and in several public forums. Particularly in the Balkans, where grotesque misinformation is a routine diplomatic and political tool, the presence of a respected international agency as a source of accurate information moderates destabilizing words and activities.

The world notices Macedonia in ways it would not in the absence of UNPREDEP. Media pay little attention to calm and quiet situations, yet the UN headquarters focuses attention on

the potential crisis in Macedonia through other means.

Ambassadors and embassy officials in the capitol of Skopje, most notably Turkish and American officials, meet frequently with the UN commander and Special Representative of the Secretary General. The UN headquarters hosts regular coordination meetings for international organizations working in the country. The Command regularly briefs diverse international visitors, as varied as Japanese diplomatic delegations, US State and Defense Department officials, leaders of multinational peacekeeping institutes, international business groups, and media ranging from Serbian television to senior journalists from US newspapers. The importance of providing an objective political-military analysis of the situation cannot be overstated. The command briefs the history of the situation and the types and levels of risk to national and regional stability.

UNPREDEP regularly monitors the military, political, economic and social situation, and then confirms, counters or balances the reporting of other agencies. For example, in 1994 US State Department officials identified as a significant risk the potential for a mass exodus of ethnic Albanian refugees from the Kosovo in Serbia through Macedonia to the Greek border, leading to conflict between Greece and Turkey. UNPREDEP used its monitors in the border area, its civil-military awareness of the situation among ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, and discussions with OSCE and ICFY to conclude that the risk of this scenario is low, and reported its assessment regularly to UNPROFOR

headquarters in Zagreb and to the US and Nordic governments through their unit national chains of command.

Peacekeepers deployed along the disputed border with Serbia and the recognized border with Albania provide an accurate picture of these sensitive border regions. Early on, they found no Serbian preparation for an invasion of Macedonia, nor any significant military activity. Yet the proximity of the war in Bosnia and the international reputation of the Serbs caused many observers to assume that military tensions in the southern Balkans were high. As late as March 1995, two experienced journalists, from the Boston Globe and The New York Times, asked during a visit to the UN HQ in Skopje how many Serb units were "massed against the border." Other visitors to UNPREDEP shared their surprise at hearing the truth--none.

Thus, a UN preventive deployment plays an important role in informing and educating the Secretary-General and the Security Council, visiting dignitaries, and media representatives.

#### The Disputed Border

UNPREDEP helps stabilize the region through border identification and verification. The potential for clashes involving border police or military units was one rationale for the preventive deployment. Macedonia's borders with Albania, Bulgaria, and Greece are undisputed, but the boundary with Serbia long had been a disputed boundary between the two republics of the former Yugoslavia. Because Serbia has not recognized the statehood of Macedonia, the countries have delayed definition of

an international boundary, although both governments are gathering data for their border commissions.

The UN commander could not "establish a presence below the disputed border" without a clear boundary. Initially, the Macedonians and Serbs refused to cooperate with his requests for data.<sup>15</sup> Promising secrecy, the commander and his staff obtained and used the differing border traces to propose an administrative UN boundary, at first dubbed the "Northern Limit of the Area of Operations" (NLAOO) but now called the "UN Line." In July 1994, both parties accepted this boundary as the northern limit of UN patrolling. That Macedonian and Serbian patrols also tend to respect this boundary indicates that the UN solution to a practical mission problem established a de facto buffer between potentially hostile parties.<sup>16</sup>

Before the Dayton peace accord led to the lifting of sanctions against Serbia, peacekeepers monitored compliance in loose coordination with the Macedonian Sanctions Assistance Mission (MACSAM). Highway and rail traffic was counted and reported. Where observations posts overlook remote smuggling routes, peacekeepers monitored the movement into Serbia of petroleum, usually carried by donkey. Although Macedonia officially condemned smuggling, her economy depended on it. The economic deprivations of the sanctions were compounded by the Greek embargo, placing Macedonia in an impossible economic squeeze. Smuggling was a lucrative avocation for many living in the disputed border area.

From August into October 1994, the UN mission reduced tension resulting from smuggling activity. Macedonian border police used deadly force both to enforce the law and to profit by robbing the smugglers. The UN leadership complained that police were violating their own policy against using deadly force to enforce anti-smuggling laws. UN complaints became urgent when a round narrowly missed an American soldier observing an automobile chase near his observation post.

Several incidents heightened border tension, which culminated with destabilizing violence. The shooting death of a Serbian army officer caught smuggling was followed by the cold-blooded shooting of an ethnic Albanian smuggler by Serbian soldiers. The UN commander approached the Serbian and Macedonian General Staffs to urge restraint. After the Macedonian General Staff informed him that the presidents of the two countries had informally agreed to lessen tensions in the border area, the UN monitored only minor incidents related to smuggling.

The Nordic battalion monitored the ethnically sensitive situation along the Albanian border, where Albanian citizens frequently crossed to visit relatives, find temporary work, or steal firewood. UNPREDEP's presence moderated a potentially dangerous situation, as Orthodox Macedonian police apprehended and returned Muslim Albanians.

These examples illustrate that preventive military presence, and actions of oversight and advice in the early stages of small crises and tensions, can prevent a cumulative effect that could

add up to more dangerous instabilities.

#### Cross-Border Contacts

As predicted by Foreign Minister Petrovsky's 1988 proposal, the military mandate clearly ordered a presence within Macedonia to protect Macedonia. However, early in the command history, Norwegian Brigadier General Tryggve Tellefsen established contact with the Serbian General Staff in Belgrade. His broad interpretation of the preventive mandate allowed him to clarify among all parties the UN's mission, thus exercising the traditional peacekeeping principle of "transparency." He felt it urgent to explain to the Serbs the planned deployment of the US contingent from a reserve posture to relieve a departing Swedish contingent along Serbia's border. The Macedonian government complained that "their" UN commander should not contact the potential enemy, highlighting a potential problem of host nation "ownership" of a preventive force. Nonetheless, the commander in March 1994 began meetings with the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Kovasevic.

The initial visits to Belgrade uncovered Serbian suspicions that the UN deployment, especially with its US battalion, foreshadowed a major influx of US and NATO forces.<sup>17</sup> The commander's personal diplomacy, bolstered considerably by generous sharing of information with the Serbs, turned Serb suspicion into trust and established a UN bridge of communication between the two governments. For example, in October 1994, General Tellefsen carried to Belgrade the good wishes of the

Macedonian Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Macedonian Armed Forces, reported on UN monitoring in the border region, explained plans for the December rotation of a new US infantry battalion, and delivered a map of the UN deployment, with all unit headquarters and observation posts plotted. In return, LTG Kovasevic reported on plans to shift border units and the state of their preparations for border commission work, and sent his good wishes to his Macedonian counterparts.

When UN military staff representatives met with the Serbian Chief of Foreign Liaison and Serbian battalion and brigade sector commanders in November 1994 near the American sector in Serbia, the Serbian delegation offered their analysis of the way the international community misunderstood and misinterpreted Serbian conduct and desires in the worsening Bosnian crisis, and asked that Serbia be seen as an essential player in any solution. Thus, Serbia used the "monitor and report" function of UNPREDEP as one vehicle to insert their voice into the regional dialogue.

The initial deployment of peacekeepers and the May 1994 deployment of US peacekeepers from static reserve to observation posts along the border heightened tension in the border area, but the steady performance of peacekeeping duties in an atmosphere of transparency and communication led to minimal military activity along the disputed border.<sup>18</sup>

This indirect contact moderated personal animosities among key leaders caused by the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. For example, Colonel-General Bocinov, the Macedonian Chief of Staff,

expressed bitterness at having been imprisoned as the vice admiral in command of the Yugoslav Adriatic fleet, for refusing to bombard historic cities along the Dalmatian coast during the Yugoslav civil war. Government leaders found in UNPREDEP a reliable, neutral, non-confrontational form of communication. The UN contact confirmed non-hostile intent, finessed the lack of diplomatic recognition, and lessened the chances for destabilizing confrontation.

In March 1995, the commander began visits with Albanian officials in Tirana. Visits with both countries continue.

Cupino Burdo/Hilltop 1703<sup>19</sup>

The most dangerous border incident took place between Serbian and Macedonian soldiers on a hilltop in the US sector, known by its local name, "Cupino Burdo," and its military map designation, "Hilltop 1703." On 14 June 1994, Macedonian officials notified the UN command that a Serbian patrol had occupied a remote hilltop within Macedonian territory. The hilltop held a memorial to Yugoslav patriots who fought Nazi occupiers during World War II, making it an attractive location to test UN and Macedonian resolve.<sup>20</sup>

American peacekeepers failed to discover the occupiers, and the US chain of command refused UN orders to send a patrol to investigate. UN military observers (UNMO's) found the Serb patrol unwilling to leave. The Macedonian Army deployed an elite company-sized force which dug in facing the Serbs. US peacekeepers eventually established a temporary observation post

on a nearby hilltop.<sup>21</sup>

Macedonian military leaders were inclined to use force, a desperate course given the overwhelming superiority of the Serbian armed forces. The UN commander intervened and convinced the parties to allow him to mediate the withdrawal of the Serbian soldiers. Had he not already established some credibility with Belgrade, his offer might have been rejected. He also had presented both military staffs with the proposed UN patrolling boundary. The Macedonians accepted it, but the Serbs had been silent on the proposal. General Tellefsen twice visited Belgrade, reported on his understanding of the crisis, and arranged to meet separately with Serbian and Macedonian officers on the site on 10 July.

On that date, the commander used two negotiating sites, one behind each force. He positioned one UN armored vehicles pointing north to carry his battalion commanders and senior staff to meet with LTG Kovasevic and members of the Serbian general staff, the other pointing south to meet with the Macedonian Chief of Staff, General Bocinov.<sup>22</sup> In four meetings he established a small UN buffer zone, which Nordic peacekeepers occupied as the Serb soldiers returned to Serbia.<sup>23</sup> Unexpectedly, during negotiations the Serbians accepted the proposal for the UN Line.

The fundamental insignificance of this remote hilltop is indicated by the subsequent lack of military activity in the area. Clearly, dangerous military confrontation can occur even when the threat seems low. The presence of UN peacekeepers in a

preventive role can defuse a crisis before conflict erupts.

#### Crisis Management

Following the crisis, the UN commander initiated a joint "preventive" organization to get Macedonian government leaders to work together with the UN and others during a crisis. So as not to intervene in host nation affairs, he proposed that the Minister of Defense establish and chair a "Crisis Management Group" (CMG), consisting of the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and other departments, and the UN civil and military leaders. A subordinate "Crisis Action Team" (CMT) chaired by the UN Chief of Staff would allow deputies to run the details of an operation. After polite acceptance by the Minister, the concept lay dormant.

Despite UN urging, the Minister of Defense did not convene the group during a UN peacekeeping exercise in February 1995. This author convened the CMT to brief government and international agency officials about the refugee assistance exercise, yet even using the concept as a construct to provide information proved intrusive. Macedonian officials were uncomfortable; the major general with whom the UN staff coordinated regularly responded with a lecture on the inappropriateness of the exercise scenario. Clearly in this instance the UN's ability to institutionalize crisis management procedures with the host government was limited.

#### Civil Affairs Support

The UN command's senior civilian uses his "good offices" to personally monitor and advise the government in their handling of

potentially dangerous situations and the international reaction, but UN military observers, civil police, military staff officers, and the peacekeeping battalions are invaluable in assisting his role. In 1994, they helped to monitor national elections and a controversial national census, adding greatly to the domestic and international credibility of these two benchmarks of democratic reform. From November 1994 through March 1995, when the ethnic Albanian community defied the government by attempting to establish an Albanian language "university" in Tetovo, they monitored demonstrations and verified government reports through their networks with the population. UNPREDEP added to regional stability as Macedonia struggled through the dangers of counting its ethnic populations and creating political coalitions.

These successes of UNPREDEP illustrate the potential value of preventive deployment to moderate the same tensions that in Croatia and Bosnia erupted in civil and ethnic war. Yet the anecdotes raise questions about consent, sovereignty, and the use of traditional peacekeeping principles.

#### Insights

##### Traditional Peacekeeping Principles: Urquhart's Box

Sir Brian Urquhart's time-tested peacekeeping principles are useful for comparing preventive deployment and traditional peacekeeping. They are:

- consent of all parties to the operation, its mandate, the force composition and its commander
- UN Security Council continuing support

- a clear and practicable mandate
- defensive use of force
- troop-contributing nation support and risk acceptance
- UN member states logistical and financial support.<sup>24</sup>

In Macedonia the four Nordic countries and the US provide high levels of support for the mission, from maintaining troop strength and skill levels to vehicle maintainance, billet upgrades, food and recreation. UNPREDEP also enjoys continuing Security Council support, and the mandate has provided the civil and military leaders of the mission with clarity and flexibility.

William Durch referred to preventive deployment as "preventive peacekeeping,"<sup>25</sup> and UNPREDEP does resemble traditional peacekeeping in key ways, performing a mandate that lies within commonly accepted peacekeeping missions, monitoring and reporting on a crisis situation. The headquarters is structured for peacekeeping, splitting functions between military command of the peacekeeping forces and a senior UN diplomat with responsibility for political/civil affairs. This sometimes uneasy marriage reflects the comprehensive and complementary nature of military, political, and humanitarian goals for the preventive mission, also typical of traditional peacekeeping.

#### Consent, Prevention, and Deterrence

However, the similarity between traditional peacekeeping and preventive deployment breaks down with "consent." As noted above, the UN commander adapted traditional peacekeeping experience to a preventive mission. He applied "transparency" to

gain "consent," and used what he termed a derivative peacekeeping principle, "vulnerability," whereby peacekeepers place themselves in harm's way as a means of gaining trust among the parties.<sup>26</sup>

Deterring potential aggression differs dramatically from the traditional peacekeeping role of helping cooperative parties maintain a cease fire or implement a peace agreement. Consent creates the environment within which a peacekeeping force operates--acceptance by all parties of their presence, their multinational makeup, the identity and nationality of the commander, and the nature of their mission. Consent establishes the legitimacy of the force. Yet parties who are being deterred and who presumably do not consent to the deployment will view it with suspicion. Without consent, tensions may rise rather than fall after the deployment.<sup>27</sup>

Heightened tensions resulted from perceptions that the UN lacked neutrality in its deterrent posture. Albania complained that a peacekeeping force was not necessary along a stable, historically peaceful border. Their sensitivity influenced the deployment of the force, so that a significant portion of the Albanian border is "monitored" not by peacekeeping soldiers, but by unarmed UN military observers, a less provocative presence. The Serbs responded to the deployment with increased patrols, observation posts, and a frightening MIG flyover into Macedonian airspace to take a close look at a US Black Hawk helicopter flying in support of US peacekeepers. Their response alarmed the US, already under intense pressure to avoid international

incidents and domestic criticism of its foreign policy.

The success of the UN force in negotiating an end to the crisis on Hilltop 1703 and the simultaneous acceptance by the parties of the UN boundary was the happy ending to a major problem that may be typical of preventive deployments. Through aggressive interpretation of the mandate, the UN created its own consent with the Serbs. Another commander, with a more cautious approach, might not have been successful. Had General Tellefsen not resisted Macedonian complaints, and had he not followed the instinct to create consent, and to be "vulnerable" and "transparent," UNPREDEP's success might be much less clear.

A preventive peacekeeping commander must be prepared to create his own consent, to establish his legitimacy among the parties. But John Gerard Ruggie has argued that "peacekeeping forces are not designed to create on the ground the conditions for their own success: those conditions must preexist for them to be able to perform their task."<sup>28</sup> UNPREDEP proved that in one preventive deployment the peacekeeping force did create the conditions for its own success. Whether consent can be created in more volatile crises remains to be seen.

A traditional peacekeeping force structure also may not meet preventive requirements. William Durch described contrasting preventive force structures that help analyze the issues surrounding consent and deterrence. Durch first suggests

the pre-crisis deployment of U.N. teams equipped with ground- or air-based local monitoring technologies intended to improve military transparency between wary neighbors.<sup>29</sup>

These light "monitor and report" teams would have a "quick escape" mechanism. A second, brigade-sized "deterrent deployment" force with combat capability representing "the will of the international community to oppose aggression"<sup>30</sup> is designed to threaten, in line with today's "peace enforcement" doctrine. His predictions of this force's vulnerability ironically anticipated UNPROFOR's unhappy history in Bosnia.

[The] U.N. should not contemplate deploying such limited forces if they would face the unpleasant alternatives of decimation or summary retreat should conflict break out. Were the former to occur, the U.N. would have a hard time recruiting contributors to subsequent deterrent forces. Were the U.N. too quick to withdraw 'deterrent' force in the face of attack, the concept would have little credibility beyond its first use.<sup>31</sup>

UNPREDEP combines Durch's concepts. Its mandate merges fact-finding ("monitor and report") with deterrence ("essentially preventive"), but unit capability fails Durch's test of structure, equipment, mobility and self-protection, for both missions. Although brigade-sized like Durch's deterrent force, it has little combat (deterrence) capability and no plans to fight. Mobility is restricted to small-unit patrolling. No combat forces are earmarked for reinforcement, although endangered peacekeepers could count on NATO. Withdrawal plans assume a permissive environment; these peacekeepers are vulnerable to being held hostage. Nor does UNPREDEP meet Durch's standards for high-tech, stand-off surveillance. Soldiers monitor with binoculars and foot patrols.<sup>32</sup>

UNPREDEP's blended approach to fact-finding and deterrence illustrates the compromises in performing a new mission with an

old force structure. Interventionist peace operations may require new principles. John Gerard Ruggie concludes:

The most basic problem with the recent, more muscular peace operations is that neither the UN, or its member states, strictly speaking know what they are doing or how to do it. . . . It is in the gray area of conflict between classical peacekeeping and all-out war-fighting that the UN has gotten into trouble. The trouble stems from the fact that the UN--the secretariat and Security Council alike--has tried simply to ratchet up and project a perfectly good instrument into highly unstable and potentially lethal environments for which it was not designed and in which it cannot succeed. . . . There is no agreed doctrine to inform operational planning and common training for missions in this gray area.<sup>33</sup>

Ruggie anticipates problems preventive deployments would encounter facing armed belligerents willing to fight.

#### The Question of Disengagement

When can a preventive mission be said to have succeeded, or failed to the point that the force must leave? The outbreak of hostilities would indicate failure, but the continued presence of a lightly armed preventive force could moderate hostilities or form the nucleus of a peace enforcement or peacekeeping force.<sup>34</sup>

Continued cooperation of the host country is key. The party that invited the deployment may find that its cost outweighs its usefulness. Macedonia's enthusiasm began to flag by early 1995, as fears of a Serbian threat waned. UNPREDEP's rapprochement with Serbia undercut the force's use as a counterbalance.<sup>35</sup> Government officials felt the burden of being "monitored and reported" by a foreign force. As the UN became involved in domestic issues, its presence became more intrusive. The government benefitted from UN legitimization of its electoral and

census process, but UN observation of other domestic activities, especially police functions, border management, and ethnic unrest, was not as welcome.

Illustrative of growing disillusionment with the UN presence, the Macedonian Army in early 1995 tried to restrict UN patrols in border areas, in the name of avoiding an accidental clash between UN and host country patrols. The UN ignored the warning, but the loss of significant host country consent or cooperation would raise serious questions of international willingness and capability to intervene in violation of a nation's sovereignty.<sup>36</sup>

Success for a preventive deployment is situation dependent. Elimination or abatement of the threat, the factors that brought the force in, should cause the force to reevaluate its usefulness. In Macedonia, some combination of the following interrelated factors would allow disengagement--self defense capability, economic viability, and social and political stability. Self-reliance in Macedonia is years away. It has virtually no defensive capability and the economy is improving only slowly, even after the lifting of the Greek embargo and international sanctions against Serbia. Ethnic and political cohesion may be the most difficult transition, even though multiethnic Yugoslavs once coexisted.<sup>37</sup>

#### The Superpower Question: Money, Troops, and Clout

US leadership in world-wide "peace operations" indicates that American strength and ideals are world resources for

collective security. But US resources are limited, whether money, political will, or shrinking numbers of deployable soldiers, and other nations seem unwilling to tackle world crises requiring military force without US involvement. The deployment of about 500 of America's 495,000 soldiers seems modest, yet for three years the 6-month mission tied up fully one-half of U.S Army, Europe's (USAREUR) six infantry battalions--one deployed, one training to go, another recovering. Now, with 20,000 US soldiers in Bosnia, USAREUR will send an armored battalion to Macedonia, placing tankers in a traditional (and perhaps inappropriate) infantry role.

The US peacekeeping battalion<sup>38</sup> supports a quiet and effective US policy to stabilize the southern Balkans, a policy that includes new bilateral relations and vigorous diplomacy, such as the work of Cyrus Vance to end Greece's embargo of Macedonia. UNPREDEP was the early proof of US national interest in ending the Balkan crisis. US soldiers would not be deployed preventively unless important US interests were at stake.

However, US military presence is not enough to support a preventive deployment; US soldiers must operate as a component of the UN force. In that role problems associated with other US-UN operations emerge, casting a shadow on the utility of US support for preventive deployments. These issues are well known--reluctance to place US soldiers under "UN command"; the overwhelming military and political "footprint" of a US force; and the ironic vulnerability of US forces, resulting in a first

priority on force protection, to the detriment of operations.

US Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) permits small, low-risk deployments to operate under UN "operational control" (OPCON) of US soldiers, and USBAT is OPCON to the Nordic force commander.<sup>39</sup> UNPREDEP's Nordic-US multinational character is a fortunate marriage of civil and military cultures. Except for Finland, the Nordic nations are members of NATO. All four Nordic countries enjoy strong cultural ties with the US, equip and train soldiers roughly to US standards, and speak English well. This coherence aids operations and coordination within the UN command, and helps build critical links between the UN commander and senior US commanders.<sup>40</sup> Despite strong ties, though, US policy and force protection concerns still hinder the complete integration of the US unit.

Capability is not the problem. Comprised of a combat battalion (sans Bradley Fighting Vehicles or tanks) and augmented by robust support elements,<sup>41</sup> the force is specifically trained by USAREUR for peacekeeping tasks and led by its regular chain of command. The disciplined and well motivated soldiers effectively man austere, remote observation posts and patrol in the rugged, windswept Balkan mountains.

However, the priority placed on force protection and resulting limitations on their operational flexibility reduce their mission utility. Setting aside the obvious point that their mere presence in Macedonia sends a powerful signal of US resolve and commitment to the stability of the southern Balkans,

this issue becomes an issue of degradation of UN mission capability. The US caution in responding to the crisis on Hilltop 1703 calls into question whether US forces should deploy where bold use of a preventive mandate is essential to success.

Four specific operational limitations lie at the heart of the problem.<sup>42</sup> From the beginning of the crisis until late Spring 1995, US soldiers were prevented from manning the observation post and the buffer zone created on Hilltop 1703, although the hill is in the US zone. Initial caution may have been understandable, given US policy toward Serbia, but the continuing caution was less so. The threat level was extremely low, and the embarrassment to US soldiers and their leaders was matched by a loss of respect on the part of their Nordic comrades; both damaged the command's unity of effort.

The other three restrictions are similar. US patrols were forbidden to deviate from preplanned patrol routes. This policy dismayed the UN commander, who wanted to investigate unusual activity in the disputed border area. Second, US patrols were forbidden to patrol within a certain distance of the UN boundary, ranging from 1000 to 300 meters, depending on the commander's understanding of the policy. Finally, the task force was forbidden to patrol at night, despite the necessity for 24-hour "presence" in the disputed border area.

Successive UN commanders pursued the elimination of these restrictions, which undermined their confidence in the battalion. Nordic peacekeepers could not understand why the US Army acted so

cautiously when the threat was almost nonexistent. American security concerns have many roots, but it may be that problems associated with the partial consent faced by a preventive deployment run deeper than thought.

#### Conclusion

Where will the next preventive mission deploy? There is no shortage of candidates; pre-crisis identification is not the problem. Many opportunities for conflict prevention beckon from every region of the globe. Our problem is one of will.<sup>43</sup>

Preventive deployment probably will not model future peace operations. UNPREDEP represents more a major-power intervention for traditional purposes than a search for collective security. Macedonia lies within the "danger zone" of the current Balkan crisis, resonating with echoes of European catastrophe, and raising critical questions about European unity, US involvement in European affairs, and NATO credibility and utility.

Yet preventive deployment works. UNPREDEP's quiet success in Macedonia has improved the stability of the southern Balkans.

And a vision appeared to Paul in the night; a certain man of Macedonia was standing and appealing to him, and saying, "Come over to Macedonia and help us." And when he had seen the vision, immediately we sought to go into Macedonia.<sup>44</sup>

So did we.



## ENDNOTES

1. Since January 1993 the UN command has undergone several changes, including name, titles of key leaders, and UN chain of command. UNPREDEP's military commander, a one-star Nordic general officer, is now the "Force Commander." The civilian head of the mission is currently termed the "Special Delegate of the Secretary-General" (SRSG). After the disbanding of UNPROFOR, UNPREDEP became a separate UN command which reports directly to the Secretary-General in New York. During the author's service with the UN in Macedonia from October 1994 to March 1995, the force was a subcommand of UNPROFOR, called the "United Nations FYROM Command," which reported to the Force Commander and SRSG (Mr. Akashi) in Zagreb, Croatia. The military commander was the "General Officer Commanding" (GOC) and the civilian chief was the "Delegate" of the SRSG, or D/SRSG. For clarity in this article, the military commander usually will be referred to as the UN commander, and the civilian chief of civil affairs as D/SRSG or SRSG, depending on chronology. However, their functions in terms of the issues in this article did not change significantly, nor has the character of the command changed over time.
2. Since this initial mandate, the command has operated under several differently numbered mandates, both military and civilian, but their terminology has not changed significantly.
3. During the author's service in Macedonia, the term "civil affairs" referred to a UN civilian function, and it will be used in this meaning throughout. The text will differentiate where US military civil affairs specialists or functions are intended.
4. Louise Lief, "The Prevent Defense," US News and World Report, 19 September 1994, 52. Perhaps if the US had spent the \$2B over the 30 years it could have truly prevented conflict in Somalia.
5. See, for example, the comments by President Bush, Prime Minister Major, President Mitterrand and other world leaders during the January 1992 first-ever Head of State and Government-level UN Security Council session, during which they called for the Secretary-General to "strengthen and make more efficient the UN capacity" for conflict prevention. "Historic Security Council session reaffirms commitment to collective security," UN Chronicle, 19 (June 1992): 4-9.
6. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, United Nations. Secretariat. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, 17 June 1992. See especially paragraphs 28-33.
7. William J. Durch, The United Nations and Collective Security in the 21st Century (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1993), 10.

8. United Nations, circulated memorandum, 1988, quoted in Thomas G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra, United Nations Peacekeeping: An ACUNS Teaching Text (New York: The Academic Council on the UN System, 1992), 36. See also Aleksandr M. Belonogov, "Soviet Peace-keeping Proposals," Survival 32 (May/June 1990): 208.

9. Johan Joergen Holst, "Enhancing Peace-keeping Operations," Survival 32 (May/June 1990): 267.

10. Weiss and Chopra, 36.

11. National Security Council, Presidential Decision Directive 25: Multilateral Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: US National Security Council, 3 May 1994). PDD-25 carefully limits UN control of US soldiers, affirming that US soldiers will never be under foreign command, only "operational control" (OPCON) of "competent" foreign commanders, and that large and/or risky deployments will be performed with a regional military organization, not the UN, and only under US command.

12. Durch, 20.

13. For an excellent discussion of US policy, see Misha Glenny, "Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans," Foreign Affairs, 74 (May 1995): 98-108. However, she is incorrect in asserting that the 500 US "marines" deployed to Macedonia "operate largely on orders from Washington, not from the U.N. peacekeeping mission of which they are theoretically a part" (p.107).

14. Michael S. Lund, "Underrating Preventive Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 74 (July 1995): 162.

15. Serbia is reluctant to begin negotiations on an international border before granting diplomatic recognition, a step probably waiting for the correct stage of their regional strategy. Macedonia's refusal to share data with Serbia is less understandable, but may stem from a reluctance to participate in even indirect negotiations in which they are the underdog, without even official recognition.

16. In the summer of 1995, the Force Commander of UNPREDEP, BG Juha Engstrom (Finland), renamed the boundary as the "UN Line," but it retains its original character. General Engstrom also initiated discussions with the Serbians and Macedonians to adjust the line to more closely identify it with terrain features. The resulting process, already in its eighth month, indicates that the border remains "disputed." The Serbians insisted on using former Soviet maps which the UN had to overprint with a Western grid system. After face-to-face agreement between the Serbian general staff and the Force Commander (the Macedonians having acquiesced) on the modest proposal, a serious misunderstanding by a low-level Serbian commander led Belgrade to believe the UN was

trying to "grab" several kilometers of their land. The UN liaison officer in Belgrade is now untangling the misunderstanding. (Lieutenant Colonel (US Army) Craig Balzer, telephonic interview by author, 27 March 1996, UN Preventive Deployment Command Headquarters, Skopje, Macedonia.)

17. A senior foreign officer stationed in Belgrade told this author that in 1993 and early 1994 the Serbian capitol was full of such rumors, which were a "common topic at cocktail parties."

18. Indicative of the level of trust, the Serbian Deputy Chief of the General Staff, LTG Kovasevic, was invited to the February 1995 change of command between the Norwegian and Finnish UN commanders. Although diplomatic realities prevented his attendance, his regrets seemed genuine. His personal liaison with the UN Force Commander has continued to this date.

19. A history of this incident is contained in a UN report by Harald Gaarder (Major, Norwegian Army, Deputy Chief Military Information and Liaison Officer, UNPREDEP), "The History of Cupino Burdo (Hill 1703)," memorandum to the UN commander, 24 March 1995, Author's files.

20. Ibid, 6. UN military information officers concluded that the opportunity for what they felt was a test of UN and Macedonian resolve was available because neither US peacekeepers (due to the 1000-meter "standoff" from the border imposed by American commanders, discussed later in this article) nor Macedonian soldiers were patrolling near this key terrain feature. However, the officers were unable to interview Serbian officials, and this conclusion is speculative. It may be that a local Serbian commander acted without Belgrade's knowledge.

21. The caution exhibited by US peacekeepers is analyzed below.

22. General Tellefsen stood in the tank commander's hatch, wearing the TC's helmet, to demonstrate his personal command of the UN force interposing itself between the parties. His use of low-key symbolic military gestures in a peacekeeping environment holds lessons for US commanders finding themselves in similar negotiating situations.

23. From that date until late Spring 1995, senior US commanders refused repeated UN and US task force commander requests to allow US peacekeepers to man this quiet OP. Resistance probably originated with the Head of the US Liaison in Skopje, who feared the Serbs would seek to embarrass the US. His recommendations through State Department channels probably influenced Pentagon decisionmakers to remain cautious. American soldiers now man the position.

24. Sir Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 198.

25. Durch, 19.

26. In February 1995, LTG de LaPresle, the UNPROFOR Force Commander, during a visit commended the UN command in Macedonia on their use of transparency, noting that it is essential to peacekeeping success.

27. For a theoretical discussion of deterrence and conflict prevention using "preventive interventions," see Richard N. Haas, "Military Force: A User's Guide," Foreign Policy 96 (Fall 1994): 21-37.

28. John Gerard Ruggie, "Peacekeeping and U.S. Interests," Washington Quarterly 17 (Autumn 1994): 180.

29. Durch, 7-12.

30. Durch, 19.

31. Durch, 20.

32. In fact, high-tech surveillance may threaten stability if it is perceived as one-sided. In early 1994 the UN commander rejected a US attempt to deploy a sophisticated radio listening system to better monitor Serb radio traffic. The US motive was improved force protection, although UN mission capability also would have benefitted. The commander, however, valued Serb good will (consent) over enhanced operational capability.

33. Ruggie, 180.

34. UNPROFOR's demonstrated moderation of the level of violence in Bosnia is evidence for the theory that a preventive deployment may have a measure of success even if hostilities break out.

35. Predictably, Macedonia's eagerness to maintain and develop the bilateral relationship with the US continues.

36. That situation pertains in Burundi now. The Secretary-General has stated that the impending crisis there is ideally suited for a robust deterrent force, but Burundi refuses to accept a UN force. Should the Security Council support the Secretary-General and form a preventive force, current planning calls for deployment in Zaire, along Burundi's border.

37. Preventive deployments may require more time. General Tellefsen stated to the author that traditional peacekeeping tended to place peacekeepers in high risk situations among formerly warring parties for a relatively short time. He felt

that preventive peacekeeping would require longer deployments in lower risk situations. The idea is intriguing, but difficult to square with the long histories of some traditional peacekeeping missions.

38. The UN designation for this force is "USBAT," following UN tradition. The sister force, composed of 500 soldiers from the four Nordic countries, is a "Nordic battalion," or "NORDBAT." However, to most US officials USBAT is "Task Force Able Sentry," or "TFAS."

39. In contrast, and again in strict compliance with PDD-25, the large and risky Bosnia mission finds a division-sized US task force deployed under the umbrella of a regional defense organization, NATO, and under US command, with CINCEUR, the CINC USNAVEUR, and a US division commander in the direct chain of command.

40. Until the formation of NATO's Implementation Force under his command, US command of TFAS began with Admiral Leighton Smith, Commander of US Naval Forces in Europe and of NATO's southern command, headquartered in Naples. He commanded all US forces operating in the former Yugoslavia. Command of TFAS now lies with the task force's senior parent commander, Commander-in-Chief, USAREUR, headquartered in Heidelberg.

41. The task force includes military police, three Black Hawk helicopters (dubbed "White Hawks" after donning white paint and the requisite black "UN" designation), an engineer platoon, a medical team complete with doctor and dentist, a skilled civil affairs cell, and a lawyer. Few US battalion commanders have enjoyed such rich resources under their direct command.

42. Since March 1995, three of these restrictions seem to have been lifted, although policies dictated long-distance from Washington through at least two US four-star headquarters can be difficult to pin down. As noted above, US soldiers finally man the OP on Hilltop 1703. Also, per telephone interview with LTC Craig Balzer, the current Chief Military Information and Liaison Officer, at UNPREDEP Headquarters on 26 March 1996, US soldiers may deviate from planned patrol routes and may patrol at night. However, they still maintain some standoff from the UN Line.

43. The Security Council's refusal to accept the Secretary-General's calls for preventive deployment to Burundi illustrates the problem well. Strong evidence indicates that a deterrent force could prevent a repeat of the catastrophe in neighboring Rwanda, where the international community intervened at great cost, and after horrible bloodshed. But in the Secretary-General's words, "There is a fatigue among member states of the UN; the US Congress doesn't want to spend the money. The international community is still not ready to accept the

expense of intervention when a war is going on, no less for preventive action." (Nathan Gardels and Leila Conners, "At 50, Does the UN Resemble the League of Nations?", New Perspectives Quarterly 12 [Summer 1995]: 37).

44. Acts 16:9-10 (New American Standard Bible).

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